The Serbo-Hungarian relations represent a special neighbourhood policy even within the Carpathian Basin, since the borders of the two countries are also the boundaries between Western and East-Central Europe, and, also, between the European Union and the Western Balkans. Although Hungary has often been described lately as a “balkanising” country, the above opposition is in fact visible at national, communication, and economic level and in political culture.
Despite all that – or, perhaps, because of that –, the friendship between Viktor Orbán, the Hungarian Prime Minister and Aleksandar Vučić, the Serbian President, has become Europe’s closest international alliance over the past fifteen years, and it is watched by some with puzzlement, while by others with concern. Indeed, besides steps in diplomatic rapprochement worthy of recognition, such as the protection of national minorities or strategic thinking along regional lines, there are similarities – though these are considered deterrent in democracies –, like political sensationalism, the monophony of public media or unsportsmanlike election campaigns.
Relations between Hungary and Serbia were not always as smooth as they have been in the last decade and a half. In fact, before 2010, and prior to the – since then much-vaunted – historical reconciliation, there were cases of nationality-based intolerance among the civilian population. Numerous hateful graffiti, physical attacks on Hungarians, punishments administered with disproportionate severity made it impossible for Hungarians in Vojvodina to feel at home in their homeland.
It is a fact, that the diplomatic rapprochement between the two countries, followed by closer cooperation between the leaders, has set a change of tone in the mainstream media and public discourse, which has significantly moderated negative attitudes in the mutual relations between Serbs and Hungarians.
The article below summarizes the most important milestones in Serbian-Hungarian diplomatic relations.
The Historical Reconciliation
The relationship between Serbs and Hungarians in the twentieth century was inherently defined by the Kingdom of Hungary’s attempt during World War II to regain some of the southern territories it had lost as a result of its involvement in World War I.
Within a raid, members of Hungarian Army executed local citizens in Novi Sad, mostly Serbs and Jews, between January 21 and 23, 1942. The number of victims is close to 4000 (according to a study by Zvonimir Golubović published in 1992).
Two years later, in the winter of 1944/45, the Serbian partisans pushed back the Hungarian forces, and immensely retaliated their earlier losses. The national and political showdowns dragged on until 1948. According to the committee of historians, the number of innocently executed Hungarian victims in Vojvodina is estimated at 11–12 thousand, but according to Tibor Cseres’ approximation, it could have been as high as 40 thousand.
These mutual grievances have been carried by the nations living here for decades.
We wrote about the current situation of Hungarians in Vojvodina – with a special view on the 1990s full of hardships – in an earlier article.
In order to clarify historical facts, a bilateral expert body, the Hungarian-Serbian Joint Academic Committee, was established in December 2010 aimed at exploring in a scientifically sound manner any points of dispute that hamper the reconciliation between the two nations.
The next milestone in leaving behind the heavy historical burden was achieved in the political dimension. In 2012, Hungarian President János Áder and Serbian President Tomislav Nikolić agreed in Budapest on the need for paying mutual respect to the innocent victims of each other’s nations.
Thereby, in January 2013, Deputy Prime Minister Tibor Navracsics participated in the commemoration of the victims of the Cold Days Massacre of Novi Sad in 1942 with Aleksandar Vučić then Deputy Prime Minister. Six months later, in June 2013, the President of the Republic of Serbia and the Hungarian President attended the commemoration of the innocent Hungarian victims of 1944/45 at the monument in Čurug.
Prior to that, Hungary’s President János Áder made a speech in the Belgrade Parliament and apologised for the crimes committed by Hungarians against innocent Serbs during the World War II.
In response to the apology, the Serbian parliament issued a declaration condemning the massacres committed against Hungarians in 1944-45 and the decisions taken in the spirit of collective guilt. However, the decree on the latter, which was imposed on the Hungarian population of three settlements (Čurug, Žabalj and Mošorin) was not – at that time – abolished.
The decree freeing Hungarians from the burden of collective guilt was only issued in November 2014, seventy years after the reprisals.
Aleksandar Vučić, the prime minister at that time, announced the abolition of that decree in Subotica during the commemoration at the Agonising Bird monument honouring the victims of the events of 1944/45, where the top leadership of Serbia was represented for the first time in the then 20-year history of the commemoration.
Since then, events that reflect on the intertwining of the common historical past, have become part of the political communication between the two countries. In 2017, Aleksandar Vučić, as the President of the Republic, together with János Áder commemorated the anniversary of the Battle of Zenta, which ended the Turkish rule. In 2019, the statue of János Hunyadi was unveiled in Zemun, also in the spirit of reconciliation, because Hunyadi led the army of Serbs and Hungarians who fought together against the Ottomans in the 1456 Siege of Belgrade.
Behind the scenes of the historic reconciliation, the Joint Academic Committee pursued intensive research work by 2016. A series of conferences and publications flared up the hope that the methods of the scientific approach would be able to end the most terrific chapter in the history of Vojvodina.
However, the final act, i.e. the publication of the much-anticipated results, has not taken place.
The historical reconciliation between Serbia and Hungary is also overshadowed by the fact that Serbian President Tomislav Nikolić, although he agreed with János Áder in 2012 that a symbolic gesture was necessary, failed to apologise on behalf of the Serbs.
Hungary – Serbia’s Principal Ally in its EU Integration
Belgrade signed a Stabilisation and Association Agreement with Brussels in 2008. Already then, Hungary supported the EU integration of the Western Balkans, but since 2010, more precisely, after the second Fidesz government came to power, it has become Serbia’s most ardent lobbyist for accession.
Serbia’s EU candidate status was granted in 2012, owing to the then ruling Democratic Party’s rapprochement with the EU, yet the change of government soon afterwards slowed down this process and the first chapter of negotiations was only opened at the end of 2015.
A key condition for the country’s EU integration is to resolve its conflict with Kosovo, which unilaterally declared independence from Serbia after the 2008 referendum, but Belgrade has not recognised it and continues to consider Kosovo as its own province.
It is also a condition of accession that Serbia keeps on the reforms undertaken in the field of fighting corruption and organised crime, and, in order to consolidate the rule of law, of protecting national and sexual minorities and people living with disabilities.
Meanwhile, in Serbia there had been a change of course. The crisis of the ruling Democratic Party led to the rise of the Serbian Progressive Party (SPP), a more moderate wing of the former far-right Serbian Radical Party. In 2012, Tomislav Nikolić took office as president under the new political force, which was also a key moment in the aforementioned Hungarian-Serbian opening.
Two years later, Fidesz had already anticipated the SPP’s imminent victory in the parliamentary elections and was preparing for long-term cooperation.
Since the SPP gained majority in the government in Belgrade in 2014, the two countries formulated their shared strategic goals and held regular joint government meetings. The representatives of the Hungarian government has never failed to mention in any of their speeches their commitment to Serbia’s EU integration efforts and urged the EU’s enlargement process.
The EU’s focus shifted towards Serbia when it became one of the most important transit countries on the route of mostly Syrian refugees during the 2015 refugee crisis. Aleksandar Vučić, a leading politician of the SPP and the current President of the Republic, noted at the plenary session of the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, that, in his opinion, Serbia’s attitude towards the refugee crisis had been more European than that of some EU members.
Later, Viktor Orbán also said at the European People’s Party Congress in Madrid that Serbia was more important than it had been earlier, as the migrant crisis could not be solved without this country. According to him, Serbia’s integration into the EU is a precondition to tackle this issue.
Aleksandar Vučić constructed the 2016 Serbian early election campaign on the narrative of EU integration. The government’s justification for holding by-elections was the need for full mandate to accomplish the already undertaken reforms and lead Serbia to the doorstep of the EU.
This was the year when the SPP won a majority in the parliament of the province and took control in most municipalities, including Subotica.
However, in relation to the planned schedule, opening the accession chapters had already been lagging behind.
The reason for that is, that Brussels made the opening of chapters dependant on the soonest implementation of the expected reforms.
Both Hungary and Serbia had hoped for a major step forward in accelerating Serbia’s accession to the EU in autumn 2019, when a Hungarian diplomat, Olivér Várhelyi was appointed head of the EU’s Commission for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Policy. In one of his first statements, Várhelyi stressed that the European Commission considers the accession of the Western Balkans as one of its top priorities and wants at least one country from the region to join the EU by the end of 2024.
A total of 22 out of 35 accession chapters was opened between 2015 and 2021 and two were closed – yet, only temporarily. 2025 was indicated as the earliest date for accession. Although the target date has not been officially extended, Várhelyi said that we can only hope for accession within five years.
The latest European Commission Country Report does not provide much scope for excessive optimism. Good progress has been made in only two chapters: statistics and environment and climate change. Serbia has made no or only moderate progress in most chapters.
On the issue of its relationship with Kosovo, a setback was noted compared to the 2013 baseline.
The EU’s position is, that Serbia’s main shortcomings are in the areas of justice, the rule of law, freedom of expression and freedom of the press.
Vučić said that despite all this, Serbia would continue to follow the European path, and the Hungarians are its key allies in that.
Diplomatic Gestures Hit All-Time Peak
Since the Hungarian government has formulated common strategic goals with its southern neighbour and committed itself to fully supporting Serbia’s EU integration, the politicians of the two countries have been making more and more substantial diplomatic gestures towards each other.
Four new road border crossings were opened between 2013 and 2019: Bački Vinogradi–Ásotthalom, Horgos–Röszke 2, Rastina–Bácsszentgyörgy and Rabe–Kübekháza crossings. The opening of the physical borders has also opened the doors wider in the relations between the two nations.
Nevertheless it was extremely embarrassing when this rapprochement levelled up, and – taking advantage of the support of Hungarian voters in Vojvodina –
the Hungarian government started to make the most of its influence during the Serbian elections from 2016 onward.
Prior to the three-tier elections, Viktor Orbán, during his visit to Subotica on 13 April 2016, encouraged Hungarians in Vojvodina to vote in the upcoming parliamentary elections and to participate in the joint decision, because (…)
“it is important that Belgrade has a government with which the Hungarian government (…) can govern together”.
Vučić won the parliamentary elections and remained in power together with his coalition partner, the Hungarian Association of Vojvodina (VMSZ).
Who the Hungarian party encourages to support depends on the type of election in question. In municipal and provincial elections, it typically encourages the support for VMSZ candidates, while in presidential and parliamentary elections in Belgrade it encourages support for SPP candidates.
As we have written in an earlier article already, Hungarians in Vojvodina can vote in the Hungarian parliamentary and EP elections since 2014. The Hungarian government has had about 40,000 stable voters from Vojvodina over the last six years, which is almost 70% of the VMSZ voter base, i.e. the Hungarian government has a decisive influence on VMSZ voters.
The encouragement was necessary so that Fidesz could help in making Vojvodina Hungarians accept the coalition agreement, concluded by the VMSZ with SPP in 2014 as a condition for the Hungarian party to join the governing coalition, but the majority of Hungarians in Vojvodina received it with skepticism.
Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Péter Szijjártó first appeared at an SPP campaign event in 2016, and after that, the Hungarian delegation was a frequent guest in pre-election events in Serbia. In 2017, when Vučić was running for head of state, Szijjártó praised the presidential candidate in Serbian, likewise in 2019 and 2023 when he spoke in Serbian at the SPP’s convention in Belgrade.
In 2021, President Aleksandar Vučić returned the gesture with a few words when he and Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán attended the laying of the foundation stone of the Subotica–Szeged railway line.
As a crown of great gestures, the top leaders of Serbian and Hungarian diplomacy have honoured each other with several prestigious awards since 2021. In 2021, Péter Szijjártó was awarded one of the highest state honours in Serbia for his role in building relations between Hungary and Serbia.
In 2022, Viktor Orbán received two awards. He was awarded the gold medal of the Order of the Saint Sava by the Serbian Orthodox Patriarch Porfirije, and the Order of Merit of the Republic of Serbia by President Aleksandar Vučić.
In 2024, Vučić was awarded the Hungarian Order of Merit by Hungarian President Tamás Sulyok on the proposal of Viktor Orbán. At the award ceremony, Vučić said, that in 2009, when neither country was under the current government,
they made an agreement in principle to build a sincere and deep friendship in case of changes in Serbia.
We are a witness to history of this friendship now.
Text: Virág Gyurkovics
Cover photo: Aleksandar Vučić awarded Viktor Orbán the Republic of Serbia Order of Merit on September 16, 2022. Source: Aleksandar Vučić / Facebook.
The text was originally published in Hungarian on 19. 11. 2024.